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Recognizing Usages of Trade:  
A Case Study from Electronic Commerce 
David McGowan* 
What role do social expectations play in contract formation, and 
why do they play it? To what degree should courts rely on market 
practices to determine legal questions such as whether or when a 
contract has been formed, or what terms it includes? For example, 
suppose buyers commonly encounter contracting methods such as 
shrink-wrap license terms delivered after a buyer places an order and, 
perhaps, makes payment. Suppose further that if they encounter this 
method often enough, over a significant period of time, buyers will 
expect to see post-payment shrink-wrap terms in future transactions. 
Is this expectation enough to hold that the terms become part of the 
agreement between the buyer and seller?1  
The usage of trade doctrine is relevant to these questions. The 
Union Commercial Code (U.C.C.) defines a usage of trade as “any 
practice or method of dealing having such regularity of observance in 
a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be 
observed with respect to the transaction in question.”2 The U.C.C. 
also specifies that the “existence and scope” of a trade usage “are to 
be proved as facts.”3 Proof of usages therefore requires evidence 
about how persons and firms behave when they form and perform 
contracts. If a court is satisfied that a party proved the existence of 
usage, the court may use that finding as a basis to interpret or 
 
 * Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. Thanks to Mark 
Lemley, Glynn Lunney, John Matheson, Brett McDonnell, and Miranda McGowan for their 
advice and comments. Remaining mistakes are my fault. This Article was prepared for the 2001 
Heart of America Intellectual Property Law Conference: “Intellectual Property, Digital 
Technology, and Electronic Commerce” co-sponsored by Washington University School of 
Law on April 6-7, 2001. 
 1. This Article will use the pairings of licensee and licensor or buyer and seller 
interchangeably. It will not address the question whether or when, if ever, an agreement 
denominated as a license may be treated as a sale.  
 2. U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (1998). 
 3. Id.  
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supplement contractual terms.  
This conventional description is incomplete. Though usages are 
facts, a judge’s decision to recognize a proffered usage as a valid 
interpretive tool, or to permit the evidence to go to the jury, is partly 
normative. As Richard Craswell has said, “the goals, beliefs, and 
other normative premises of the person” with the power to recognize 
customs “must inevitably play a part in the interpretation and 
application of customs.”4 For example, suppose a party claims that it 
is standard practice for certain types of agreements to include 
punitive forfeiture provisions for nonperformance or to pledge the 
promisor’s first-born child as security for performance. If proved, 
these practices would not count as usages on which courts would rely 
in interpreting agreements. In these two examples, the proposed 
usage would conflict with other contract rules: the prohibition on 
punitive liquidated damages and the rule that courts may decline to 
enforce unconscionable terms.5  
Are trade usages limited only by conflicts with mandatory 
contract rules? To return to our shrink-wrap example, suppose 
evidence shows that all vendors employ shrink-wrap terms and all 
consumers ignore the terms because they believe them to be 
unenforceable. Such consumer beliefs are relevant to assent, the legal 
doctrine to which the alleged usage is relevant. A judge considering 
the alleged usage therefore would have to choose whether to give 
 
 4. Richard Craswell, Do Trade Customs Exist? in THE JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW (Kraus & Waltz eds., 1999); see also Stewart 
Macaulay, Relational Contracts Floating On A Sea of Custom? Thoughts About the Ideas of Ian 
MacNeil and Lisa Bernstein, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 775, 786 (2000) (stating that Craswell is right 
“in all but extreme cases”); John M. Breen, Statutory Interpretation and the Lessons of 
Llewellyn, 33 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 263, 342 (2000) (quoting U.C.C. §§ 1-205(2), 2-202, cmt. 
2): 
“Clearly trade usage under the Code has a descriptive, empirical basis. Nevertheless, 
the decision to recognize such usages of trade as well as the requirement that they 
enjoy a `regularity of observance’ embodies a set of normative judgments as to what 
facts are likely to evidence the parties’ common intentions. Likewise, the presumption 
that such usages were `taken for granted when the document was phrased’ and so 
`have become an element of the meaning of the words used’ unless `carefully negated’ 
is a normative judgment that such usage is a good `indication of what [the parties] 
intended the writing to mean.’”  
 5. See U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (penalty terms invalid); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 208 (1979) (addressing unconscionability). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol8/iss1/7










2002]  Recognizing Usages of Trade 169 
 
 
force to the seller’s wish that the terms be included or the buyer’s 
belief that they should not. On what principle would such a decision 
rest? What of the used car dealer’s claim that rolling back the 
speedometer is a usage of trade?6 Must we have a statute barring that 
conduct before a court can refuse to recognize it as a usage? 
This Article uses some of the significant shrink-wrap licensing 
cases between 1991 and 2000 to study how a judge’s own beliefs and 
presumptions affect the decision whether to recognize a usage of 
trade. A review of these cases suggests that judges became more 
willing to accept post-order shrink-wrap terms as a method of 
forming an agreement as they either became more familiar with that 
method or came to accept economic arguments used to justify 
recognition of that method.  
Two cases in particular highlight this point. In its 1991 Step-Saver 
decision,7 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected a 
defendant’s claim that a course of dealing made post-order shrink-
wrap terms part of the agreement between a software vendor and a 
value-added reseller, which wrote and licensed software itself, even 
though the facts provided substantial support for the claim.8 The Step-
Saver court appeared to demand actual bargaining or express assent 
as a prerequisite to recognizing those terms as part of the agreement.9 
In 2000, the Washington State Supreme Court reached a contrary 
result regarding an agreement between a vendor and an end-user in 
its Mortenson decision,10 even though the facts there presented a 
much weaker case for judicial recognition of either a course of 
dealing or usage of trade.11  
This Article does not attempt to prove that the two cases were 
decided differently only because judges became more familiar with 
the shrink-wrap method and were therefore more comfortable giving 
legal effect to it. There are too many variables for that assumption.12 
 
 6. Jones v. W. Side Buick Co., 231 Mo. App. 187 (1936). 
 7. Step-Saver Data Syss., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 8. Id. at 108.  
 9. Id. at 104.  
 10. M.A. Mortenson Co., Inc. v. Timberline Software Corp., 970 P.2d 803 (Wash. 2000). 
 11. Id. at 80.  
 12. As will be shown, the vendor in Step-Saver tried and failed to obtain negotiated assent 
to agreements that included the shrink-wrap terms. This fact probably affected the decision. The 
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This Article claims only that the trend of decisions throughout the 
1990s suggests that judicial presumptions and attitudes are variables 
that should be taken into account in dealing with the usage of trade 
concept. The most important event in this account was Judge 
Easterbrook’s opinion for the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg.13 In that case, he persuasively 
normalized the use of shrinkwrap terms by arguing that they provided 
benefits to both producers and consumers and by plausibly 
analogizing the shrink-wrap method to transactions with which 
judges would be familiar, such as the purchase of insurance or 
consumer electronics.14  
To the extent there is a normative aspect to recognizing usages of 
trade, to which judicial attitudes and understandings are relevant, 
judges should try to make that aspect of the analysis as explicit and 
rigorous as possible. Bringing to the forefront the normative elements 
of the decision to recognize or reject a trade usage will help judges 
check their own biases against the purposes of contract law, make the 
normative analysis more systematic and reliable, help lawyers give 
more useful advice to clients, and thereby make the usage of trade 
concept more reliable and useful.  
Courts should not consider evidence of widespread adoption by 
parties on one side of a transaction enough, standing alone, to 
establish a usage of trade. Instead, courts should demand additional 
evidence or analysis establishing that the practice or term in question 
can be justified under the Kaldor-Hicks welfare criterion.15 This 
criterion is satisfied if the gains from an action or course of conduct 
exceed the losses such that the winners could compensate the losers 
for their losses although actual compensation is not required.16  
Satisfaction of this criterion implies at least potential benefits for 
 
court did not rest on this fact alone, however, and its broader analysis is consistent with the 
discussion in the text. See infra text accompanying notes 86-94.  
 13. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 14. Id. at 1451.  
 15. For discussion of Kaldor-Hicks criterion, see Thomas S. Ulen, Book Review, 41 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 643, 647 n.9 (2001) (reviewing DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, LAW’S ORDER: 
WHAT ECONOMICS HAS TO DO WITH LAW AND WHY IT MATTERS (Princeton Univ. Press 
2000)). 
 16. Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol8/iss1/7
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both sides of the class of transactions at issue. The actual distribution 
of benefits will depend on market conditions and bargaining. If a 
proffered usage yields gains concrete and significant enough to 
satisfy the criterion, it also provides a basis to conclude that rational 
contracting parties might be willing, ex ante, to adopt the usage at 
issue.  
Some might object that this approach merely invites uninformed 
judicial activism. That criticism identifies a genuine and serious risk. 
But if a proffered usage cannot satisfy this relatively modest 
criterion, one must ask why a judge should recognize it. The 
conventional answer is that judges lack the information and 
knowledge to understand the welfare implications of usages. On this 
view, the judicial decision to recognize a usage is a bet that deferring 
to the parties’ conduct reduces both the probability of a mistaken 
(inefficient) decision and the harm resulting from the mistake. Courts 
recognize usages, in other words, to reduce error costs. This analysis 
is all well and good, but the lack of information and knowledge that 
makes it risky for judges to decide questions directly, thus justifying 
the use of usages, also makes it risky for judges to identify usages, 
too.17 
If one believes that judicial perceptions of what counts as a usage 
cannot be divorced from normative considerations, then it is to the 
advantage of all concerned to make that aspect of the analysis as 
rigorous and transparent as possible. This Article aims not to invite 
judges to do something new, but to help them articulate in a rigorous 
and replicable manner what they are probably doing already.  
Four caveats are necessary before we begin. First, this approach is 
more of a heuristic than a standard. It is a question a court should ask, 
a way of looking at a proposed usage, that might result in better 
analysis. A party asserting the usage should not be forced to show 
that rational ex ante contracting would necessarily have produced the 
precise set of terms or practices at issue. That would be too much of a 
judicial intrusion into the contracting process.  
Second, some such benefits will be plausible in virtually every 
case. For example, assuming a competitive market, any term that 
 
 17. See Macaulay, supra note 4, at 786.  
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reduces a seller’s costs or allows it to discriminate among types of 
buyers allows the seller to argue that the term lowers the average 
price of the product, thereby benefitting buyers generally. This 
example is probably true in many cases. Arguments so powerful have 
to be treated with care, however, because they fail to distinguish 
among different types of cost-reducing behavior and terms. A term 
pledging a first-born child as security would lower the seller’s costs 
as well, by reducing the expected cost of default. It would not follow 
that the term is conscionable or that it should be recognized as a 
usage of trade. Such arguments have to be analyzed in the context of 
concrete facts, and accepted or rejected in light of that context.  
Third, this Article simply assumes that meaningful usages exist 
with a degree of consistency that warrants attention. It is perhaps 
ironic that the newest uniform contracting statute–the Uniform 
Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA) makes extensive 
use of the usage of trade doctrine at precisely the time that scholars 
such as Lisa Bernstein are challenging the notion the meaningful 
usages exist with any consistency.18 Courts are applying the usage of 
trade concept in deciding cases, however, and UCITA makes 
extensive use of the concept. This Article therefore explores 
analytical techniques that will assist in the application of the usage of 
trade concept.  
Fourth, the debate over shrinkwrap terms is probably over as a 
legal matter, and is less relevant as a factual matter than it used to be. 
This Article intends not to rehash the merits of cases like Step-Saver 
or ProCD, but to analyze the shift in judicial presumptions about 
contracting between Step-Saver in 1991 and Mortenson in 2000. 
Tracking this shift provides a useful perspective on the analysis 
courts employ in recognizing or rejecting usages.  
Part I of this Article briefly discusses the usage of trade concept. 
Part II discusses the shift in judicial approaches to shrinkwrap 
licenses from Step-Saver to Mortenson. Part III discusses the lessons 
of these cases in considering the judicial role in recognizing usages of 
 
 18. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2’s 
Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710, 715 (1999) (stating “‘. . . 
[u]sages of trade’ and ‘commercial standards’ as those terms are used by the Code, may not 
consistently exist, even in relatively close-knit merchant communities”).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol8/iss1/7
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trade. Part III also considers the warranty of non-infringement and 
the possibility of disclaiming it by trade usage as an example of the 
type of analysis courts should engage in when considering usages in 
the future.  
I. USAGE OF TRADE 
As noted above, Section 1-205(2) of the U.C.C. defines a usage of 
trade as “any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of 
observance in a place, vocation, or trade as to justify an expectation 
that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question.”19 
The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA) uses 
the same definition.20 Section 1-201(3) of the U.C.C. defines 
“agreement” to mean the “bargain of the parties in fact as found in 
their language or by implication from other circumstances 
including . . . usage of trade.”21 UCITA again mirrors this language.22  
Consistent with this approach, Section 1-205(3) of the U.C.C. 
states that a usage of trade in any vocation in which the parties are 
engaged or “of which they . . . should be aware” may be used to “give 
particular meaning to and supplement or qualify terms of an 
agreement.”23 Section 2-202(a) of the U.C.C. provides that even the 
final written expression of a contract may be “explained or 
supplemented” by a usage of trade.24 Section 301(1) of UCITA is to 
the same effect.25 Both the U.C.C. and UCITA require judges to 
employ “applicable” usages of trade “in the place where any part of 
performance is to occur . . . in interpreting the agreement as to that 
part of the performance.”26  
 
 19. U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (1998).  
 20. UCITA § 102(a)(66), cmt. 57 (2000). 
 21. U.C.C. § 1-201(3). 
 22. UCITA §102(a)(4). 
 23. U.C.C. § 1-205(3). Comment 1 to this provision makes clear that the context created 
by “commercial practices and other surrounding circumstances” may be used to “explain and 
supplement even the language of a formal or final writing.” U.C.C. § 1-205 cmt. 1. 
 24. U.C.C. § 2-202(a).  
 25. UCITA § 301(1).  
 26. U.C.C. § 1-205(5); UCITA § 302(c). UCITA states a clear preference for contextual 
over literal or abstract interpretation, a preference that emphasizes the role of usages of trade. 
As the comment to section 113(b) states, 
commercial factors also provide the background and give meaning to language used. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Usages have traditionally been interpretive tools that help courts 
ascertain the parties’ agreement.27 UCITA in general “treats usage of 
trade as a factor in determining the commercial meaning of the 
agreement. The language of an agreement is interpreted as meaning 
what it may fairly be expected to mean to parties involved in the 
particular commercial transaction.”28 Thus, when recognized, usages 
are as much a part of the parties’ agreement as any other explicit 
term. To the extent applicable in a particular case, usages trump 
default rules that the parties can vary by agreement.29 By parity of 
reasoning, usages do not trump rules that parties cannot vary by 
agreement, such as the unconscionability doctrine or the statute of 
frauds.30  
Under UCITA, usages of trade may also be employed to 
determine what the parties knew or should have known when dealing 
with each other. Section 114(f) of UCITA provides that “[a] person 
has reason to know a fact if the person has knowledge of the fact or, 
from all the facts and circumstances known to the person without 
investigation, the person should be aware that the fact exists.”31 
Comment 6 to this section makes it clear that presumed knowledge 
includes customary practice: 
A person has reason to know a fact if the person has 
information from which a reasonable person would infer that 
the fact does or will exist based on all the circumstances, 
including the overall context and ordinary expectations. The 
 
The meaning of the terms of an agreement must be interpreted in light of practical 
considerations that reflect common commercial understanding. Abstract concepts 
about what an agreement should mean are not as important as are grounded 
interpretations of what an agreement does mean in context. 
UCITA § 113(b) cmt. 3. 
 27. See generally Bristow v. Drake St., Inc., 41 F.3d 345, 351-52 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 28. UCITA § 102 cmt. 57. Section 113(b) of UCITA similarly provides that any usages of 
trade “of which the parties are or should be aware . . . are relevant to determining the existence 
or meaning of an agreement.” UCITA § 113(b). 
 29. In particular, usages “furnish the background and give particular meaning to the 
language used, and are the framework of common understanding controlling any general rules 
of law which hold only when there is no such understanding.” U.C.C. § 1-205 cmt. 4; see also 
UCITA § 302, cmt. 5. 
 30. UCITA § 113(a); cf. The Star, 53 F.2d 890 (W.D. Wash. 1931) (rejecting claim that 
local custom for free assistance trumped entitlement to compensation under admiralty law). 
 31. UCITA § 114(f). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol8/iss1/7
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person is charged with commercial knowledge of any factors 
in a particular transaction that in common understanding or 
ordinary practice are to be expected, including reasonable 
expectations from usage of trade and course of dealing and 
widespread business practice.32 
Inferences based on trade usage are important to the concept of 
“layered” contracting in which additional terms are delivered after an 
order is submitted and, perhaps, after payment is made. UCITA 
section 202(c) states that an agreement may be formed even if “one 
or more terms are left open or to be agreed upon,” so long as the 
parties agree to this procedure.33 The comment to this section 
explains that parties can use usage of trade to establish the parties’ 
agreement: “Many contract terms are intended, expressly or by usage 
of trade or the like, to be defined over time, rather than on the 
occurrence of one specific event.”34  
 
 32. UCITA § 114 cmt. 6. The comment goes on to distinguish “reason to know,” which 
indicates only that a party had access to facts from which knowledge of a relevant fact could 
have been gained, from both “knowledge” itself and the concept of “should know,” which 
implies a duty to investigate: 
“Reason to know” must be distinguished from knowledge. Knowledge means an actual 
conscious belief in or awareness of a fact. Reason to know need not entail a conscious 
belief in or awareness of the existence of the fact or its probable existence in the 
future. Of course, a person that has knowledge of a fact also has reason to know of its 
existence. Reason to know is also to be distinguished from “should know.” “Should 
know” imports a duty to ascertain facts; the term “reason to know” does not entail or 
assume an obligation to investigate, but is determined solely by the information 
available to the party. The latter term is used where the person would not be acting 
adequately in protecting its own interests if it did not act in light of the facts of which 
it had reason to know. 
 Id. 
 33. UCITA § 202(c). 
 34. UCITA § 202 cmt. 4. The comment goes on to say that: 
Contract formation is often a process, rather than a single event. A rule that a contract 
must arise at a single point in time and that this single event defines all the terms of the 
contract is inconsistent with commercial practice. Contracts are often formed over 
time; terms are often developed during performance, rather than before performance 
occurs. Often, parties expect to adopt records later and that expectation itself is the 
agreement. Rather than modifying an existing agreement, these terms are part of the 
agreement itself. Treating later terms as proposed modifications is appropriate only if 
the deal has previously been, in the commercial understanding of both parties, fully 
closed with no reason to know that new terms would be provided. 
Id. The comments to the proposed revision of U.C.C. section 2-207 are less receptive to this 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The knowledge requirement is given force in UCITA section 
208(2), which provides that a party may agree to contractual terms, 
the terms of a record “after beginning performance or use if the 
parties had reason to know that their agreement would be represented 
in whole or part by a later record to be agreed on and there would not 
be an opportunity to review the record or a copy . . . before 
performance or use begins.”35 Comment 3(a) to this section makes it 
clear that:  
Contract terms proposed for later agreement to complete the 
initial contract are part of the initial contracting process if the 
parties had reason to know that later terms would be proposed. 
“Reason to know” means that, realistically considered, later 
presentation of terms should not be a surprise. It does not 
require specific notice or specific language, although such 
factors may be important because notice suffices. “Reason to 
know” can also be inferred from the circumstances, including 
ordinary business practices or marketing approaches of which 
a party is or should be aware and from which a reasonable 
person would infer that terms will follow.36  
 
“layered” contracting model. Comment 4 to the August 2001 revision of section 2-207 states 
that  
[a]n “agreement” may include terms derived from a course of performance, a course of 
dealing, and usage of trade . . . . If the members of trade or if the contracting parties 
expect to be bound by a term that appears in the record of only one contracting party, 
that term is part of the agreement. However, repeated use of a particular term or 
repeated failure to object to a term on another’s record is not normally sufficient in 
itself to establish a course of performance, a course of dealing or a trade usage. 
See U.C.C. § 2-207 preliminary cmt. 4 (Proposed Draft, Aug. 2001) [hereinafter U.C.C. Draft], 
available at http://law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucc2/ucc0612.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2002). 
 Somewhat curiously in light of this statement, comment 5 states that “[a]mended Article 2 
takes no position on the question whether a court should follow the reasoning” of Hill v. 
Gateway 2000, 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) or Step-Saver Data Syss., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 
939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991). U.C.C. Draft, preliminary cmt. 5. The differences in those cases are 
discussed in the text accompanying infra notes 80-123. It is worth noting here that Hill, to 
which the U.C.C. comment refers, involves a consumer transaction. Though some analysts 
assume that usages may only be applied to persons “in trade,” the definition of a usage is not so 
limited. Evidence of usages may be more common within trades, but the logic behind the 
concept of usages applies generally to problems of information and interpretation. 
 35. UCITA § 208(2). 
 36. UCITA § 708 cmt. 3(a). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol8/iss1/7
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As this section suggests, and as we saw earlier, a party might be 
found to have “reason to know” of post-order or post-payment terms 
if the court finds that such terms amount to a usage of trade in a 
relevant market. Consequently, a court can bind licensees, in either 
commercial or consumer markets, to post-order or post-payment 
terms if a court recognizes the use of such terms as a usage of trade. 
Actual knowledge is not required; licensors have no obligation to 
inform licensees of the terms or even that they will deliver additional 
terms with the product.  
Usages of trade are, of course, not limited to shrink-wrap licenses 
or problems of formation. The “reason to know” concept in UCITA is 
a general supplementary principle. This concept plays a role, for 
example, in determining when warranties have been validly 
disclaimed,37 as well as in its more traditional role of interpreting or 
supplementing contractual language. The standards courts use for 
recognizing usages are therefore important.  
The requirements for recognizing usages of trade under the 
U.C.C. are less stringent than the requirements for recognizing 
custom at common law. For a practice to be recognized as custom, it 
must be adopted universally within a relevant group, and practiced 
for a long time.38 Custom in this form was a supplementary form of 
law. It bound persons regardless of their consent.39 Custom in the 
 
 37. See UCITA § 401(e); UCITA § 406(e) (“An implied warranty may also be disclaimed 
or modified by course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade.”). 
 38. Hawkland states that “[t]o be effective common law custom had to be: ‘(1) legal; (2) 
notorious; (3) ancient or immemorial and continuous; (4) reasonable; (5) certain; and (6) 
universal and obligatory.’” WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, U.C.C. SERIES §1-205.4 (2000) (quoting 
Joseph H. Levie, Trade Usage and Custom Under the Common Law and the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 40 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1101, 1103 (1965)); see also Elizabeth Warren, Trade 
Usage and Parties in the Trade: An Economic Rationale for an Inflexible Rule, 42 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 515, 519 (1981).  
 39. Levie, supra note 38, at 1102-03. As one court suggested, 
Strictly speaking, there is a distinction between “custom” and “usage”; “custom” 
referring rather to those usages which have existed and been universally recognized for 
so long a period as to have acquired the force of law, and to be binding without regard 
to the assent of the individual, and such as the “law merchant,” etc., while “usage” 
refers to “an established method of dealing, adopted in a particular place, or by those 
engaged in a particular vocation or trade, which acquires legal force because people 
make contracts in reference to it.” 
Byrd v. Beall, 43 So. 749, 751 (Ala. 1907) (quoting 29 AM. & ENG. ENCY. LAW, 365; 12 CYC. 
1033).  
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commercial context faced a somewhat less stringent test. Courts used 
commercial custom to ascertain the best practices merchants 
employed and to thereby rule more sensibly on disputes about which 
the judge might have little expertise.40 A commercial custom did not 
have to trace itself to time immemorial, a senseless requirement in 
this context, but it did have to be widely, if not uniformly, used 
among merchants. It was the widespread agreement on a practice that 
allowed a court to conclude that commercial customs had a normative 
basis deserving legal respect.41 The merchant jury, employed to 
advise judges on customary aspects of commercial cases, existed for 
similar reasons.42 
The U.C.C. allows courts to recognize “new usages and . . . 
usages currently observed by the great majority of decent dealers, 
even though dissidents ready to cut corners do not agree.”43 The 
“great majority” language reflected pre-Code practice, in which 
majority adherence to a practice was not enough to establish it as a 
usage.44 The comments to UCITA state this principle in milder terms, 
saying that “[f]ull recognition [of usages] is available for new uses 
and for uses currently observed by the majority of merchants, even 
though some do not.”45 
The reference in the U.C.C. comments to “decent” dealers brings 
 
 40. As Professor Cooter states, “Mansfield knew that he did not understand fully how 
businesses use financial instruments. Consequently, he did not try to invent better rules than the 
ones in practice. Rather, he carefully scrutinized business transactions and tried to identify and 
enforce the best practices.” Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law For A Complex Economy: 
The Structural Approach To Adjudicating The New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 
1648 (1996). On the difference between Mansfield’s approach and ancient custom, see 
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 189-90 (1977). 
 41. HOROWITZ, supra note 40, at 189-90. 
 42. See, e.g., R. KENT NEWMAYER, JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE OLD REPUBLIC 
122 (1985) (noting Story’s use of merchant juries to resolve issues of custom and usage while 
riding circuit in New England). 
 43. U.C.C. § 1-205 cmt. 5 (1998).  
 44. Levie, supra note 38, at 1105 n.26 (citing cases including Bagwell v. Susman, 165 
F.2d 412, 416 (6th Cir. 1947) (“if it were only usually or generally done by most manufacturer 
[sic], there is very little in such a practice to correspond to the imperative, compulsory, 
universal character which is considered necessary to establish a custom, as that term is 
understood in law”); Caggiano v. Marchegiano, 327 Mass. 574 (1951) (evidence that a majority 
of contracts between boxers and managers included certain terms was not adequate to establish 
custom).  
 45. UCITA, § 102 cmt. 57 (2000). 
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up an interesting point. Some statements of the usage of trade 
concept, such as Article 1.8(2) of the UNIDROIT principles, provide 
explicitly that courts will only apply usages where it is reasonable to 
do so.46 As one court said in a case decided before adoption of the 
U.C.C.:  
The reasonableness of a particular custom for which legal 
effect is sought is always a subject of inquiry by the court, and 
when it is ascertained that the custom is contrary to the public 
good and is prejudicial to the many and beneficial only to the 
favored few, it will find itself repugnant to the principles of 
fair dealing which otherwise entitle a custom to be recognized 
in a court of justice.47 
 
 46. UNIDROIT, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 19 (1994) 
(“[P]arties are bound by a usage that is widely known to be and is regularly observed in 
international trade by parties in the particular trade concerned, except where the application of 
such a usage would be unreasonable.”). 
 47. Jones v. West Side Buick Co., 231 Mo. App. 187, 93 S.W. 2d 1083, 1086 (1936); 
accord Sherrill-Russell Lumber Co. v. Krug Lumber Co., 267 S.W. 14, 17 (1924). 
[A] custom which requires the purchaser to accept the lumber in a car that contains 
only 75 per cent. of the lumber within the grade ordered, is unreasonable, placing the 
purchaser at a disadvantage in using and taking care of such car of lumber . . . . Such 
an unfair and unrighteous custom as the evidence in this case tends to establish the law 
should not allow to exist, much less encourage and enforce. Neither in practice nor on 
principle can such a custom be upheld. The evidence relating to the custom should not 
have been admitted. 
Id.; Stein v. Shapiro, 145 Minn. 60 (1920) (refusing to recognize alleged custom of paying for 
hides with check rather than cash; stating “Nor will evidence of an unreasonable usage or 
custom be permitted to inject an obligation into a contract”); Byrd v. Beall, 43 So. 749, 751 
(Ala. 1907) (refusing to recognize “bad” usage requiring shipper to accept unsworn statement 
of consignee as to condition of shipment); Anderson v. Whitaker, 11 So. 919, 920-21 (Ala. 
1893) (rejecting custom evidence of workmanlike construction; stating “Any custom which 
would operate to convert these gross defects in the work done into work done in a workmanlike 
manner would be altogether unreasonable, bad, and inadmissible”); Anewalt v. Hummel, 109 
Pa. 271, 274 (1885) (holding that proof of custom was inadequate and, in the alternative, that 
custom allowing tenant to use hay and cornstalks left on leased farm when tenant took 
possession without paying compensation to landlord or leaving a like amount on departure was 
unreasonable). Interestingly, in Anewalt the court objected to the one-sided nature of the alleged 
custom:  
[H]ad the proof been clear, it was a bad custom. It was so wholly unreasonable that it 
could not be set up as a defence. It was a custom that the tenant may use the property 
of his landlord without making compensation. The tenant might with equal propriety 
have set up a custom that his landlord should pay his debts or give him his share of the 
crops. It is a familiar rule of law that a custom to be valid must be reasonable. 
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The U.C.C. significantly modified this approach. Though the 
U.C.C. “carries forward the policy underlying the ancient 
requirement that a custom or usage must be ‘reasonable’” it does so 
through the doctrine of unconscionability, a doctrine that typically 
cannot condemn merely “unreasonable” conduct.48 The drafters 
believed a different approach was warranted because “[t]he very fact 
of commercial acceptance makes out a prima facie case that the usage 
is reasonable, and the burden is no longer on the usage to establish 
itself as being reasonable.”49 The comment concludes by stating that 
“the anciently established policing of usage by the courts is continued 
to the extent necessary to cope with the situation arising if an 
unconscionable or dishonest practice should become standard.”50  
The comments to UCITA do not include a similar discussion, but 
it seems safe to infer that these comments are relevant to UCITA as 
well. UCITA’s approach to usage of trade generally tracks the U.C.C. 
UCITA does its best to funnel challenges to the “fairness” of terms or 
practices into the doctrine of unconscionability. Along this line, 
UCITA explicitly rejects the “unfair surprise” doctrine of 
Restatement of Contracts (Second) § 211(3), calling instead for 
courts to address such issues under the doctrine of 
unconscionability.51 Presumably, UCITA’s drafters hoped the 
relatively stringent standards for showing unconscionability will 
restrain judges from activist revision of terms and practices whose 
economic consequences a judge might dislike or misunderstand. This 
trend probably encompasses the recognition of usages of trade.  
This approach is puzzling. One cannot carry forward a doctrine 
that says courts should recognize only reasonable usages by having 
judges apply the much looser standard of unconscionability. Perhaps 
 
Id. 
 48. U.C.C. § 1-205 cmt. 6 (1998). An unconscionable contract or clause is often 
colloquially referred to as one that shocks the conscience of the court. One Alabama court 
characterized an unconscionable agreement as “one that no man in his senses, not under 
delusion, would make on the one hand, and that no fair and honest man would accept on the 
other.” Wilson v. World Omni Leasing, Inc., 540 So.2d 713, 716 (Ala. 1989). Comment 2 to 
section 2-302 states that “the principle is one of the prevention of oppression or unfair 
surprise.” U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 2. 
 49. U.C.C. § 1-205 cmt. 6. 
 50. Id. 
 51. UCITA § 208 cmt. 7 (2000). 
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this option would be possible if there were some sort of reasonability 
requirement for recognizing usages in the first place. If that were the 
case, however, there would be no reason to mention 
unconscionability as a check on usages. The comments to section 1-
205 negate any such threshold requirement and invoke a presumption 
in favor of recognizing the usage once a party introduces evidence 
demonstrating its existence. Parties commonly employ usages of 
trade to clarify or supplement contractual terms; courts may refuse to 
enforce unconscionable terms no matter how they are specified,52 so 
to say that courts will recognize only conscionable usages adds 
nothing to the analysis.  
To complicate matters further, one cannot fully separate the 
question of conscionability from the facts relevant to establishing a 
usage of trade. For example, U.C.C. section 2-302(2) provides that in 
litigating a claim that an agreement or term is unconscionable, the 
parties “shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present 
evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose, and effect . . . .”53 
Commercial context may include usages of trade.54 Presumably, a 
court considering context evidence under section 2-302 would follow 
the approach of the comments to section 1-205 and weigh the 
existence of a usage against a finding of unconscionability. Unless 
treated with care, the use of commercial context as evidence of 
conscionability threatens to result in circular analysis and render 
unconscionability a meaningless limitation on judicial recognition of 
usages of trade.55 Perhaps this threat is why the court in American 
Nursery Prods., Inc. v. Indian Wells Orchards reverted to pre-Code 
terminology and said that only a “reasonable usage of trade” could be 
used to show conscionability.56  
Setting this risk aside, section 1-205 allows courts to recognize 
 
 52. E.g., U.C.C. § 2-302. 
 53. U.C.C. § 2-302(2); UCITA § 111(b). 
 54. See Am. Nursery Prods., Inc. v. Indian Wells Orchards, 797 P.2d 477, 481 (Wash. 
1990) (“The party defending the clause may prove the clause is conscionable regardless of the 
surrounding circumstances if the general commercial setting indicates a prior course of dealing 
or reasonable usage of trade as to the exclusionary clause.”).  
 55. A similar risk inheres in the U.C.C.’s use of trade usage to give content to section 1-
203’s obligation of good faith, see section 1-203 cmt. 5, and in section 2-103(1)(b)’s reference 
to “reasonable commercial standards” to define good faith.  
 56. 797 P.2d at 481. 
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widely used terms or practices such as usages of trade as long as they 
are conscionable.57 The basis for this whole structure is section 1-
205’s presumption that widespread use of a term implies that it is 
reasonable.58 This proposition is not obviously true. For example, the 
court in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.59 thought the 
warranty disclaimers at issue in that case reduced nonprice 
competition in the relatively concentrated market in which the 
contracts were employed.60 The defendant in Jones v. West Side 
Buick, Co.61 argued that he only followed custom in the used car 
industry by turning back the speedometer after having the car 
reconditioned, a claim that would have impeded, if not defeated, the 
plaintiff’s cause of action for fraud if a court believed that 
widespread use of the practice gave the plaintiff reason to know of it. 
This problem also may surface on the buyer’s side of a transaction. 
For example, the tenant in Anewalt v. Hummel sought recognition of 
a usage that allowed tenants to consume feed left on a leasehold 
property without either replenishing it or compensating the 
landlord.62 
In each of these cases, parties on one side of a class of 
transactions sought to establish usages that benefitted only their side. 
In each case, some economic argument could be made for the 
practice. The defendants in Henningsen could say the disclaimers 
lowered their costs and, therefore, increased social welfare, even if 
 
 57. Hawkland states that the reference to “decent” dealers in comment 5 “suggests, as 
would be expected, that neither unreasonable nor unethical kinds of usage may qualify as trade 
usage.” HAWKLAND, supra note 38. He correctly notes the seemingly more lenient language in 
comment 6, however, and the cases he cites discuss unconscionability rather than reasonability 
as a limitation on the recognition of trade usage. See also Fleming Farms v. Dixie AG Supply, 
Inc., 631 So.2d 922 (Ala. 1994) (clause limiting damages for breach of warranty was 
enforceable where it was widely used and conscionable); Southland Farms, Inc. v. CIBA-Geigy 
Corp., 575 So.2d 1077 (Ala. 1991). 
 58. On their own, terms like “reasonable,” “decent,” or “fair” do little if any useful work. 
They are primarily invoked either as conclusions to analysis or, more troublingly, as assertions 
in place of analysis. Either way, to see the term invoked is to be forewarned that analytical work 
on a problem has either come to an end or is on vacation. I return to the problem of giving some 
content to these terms in Part III.  
 59. 32 N.J. 358 (1960). 
 60. For an economic critique of this argument, see Alan Schwartz, A Reexamination of 
Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. REV. 1053, 1071-76 (1977). 
 61. 231 Mo. App. 187 (1936). 
 62. 109 Pa. 271, 274 (1885). 
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cartelization reduced the output of cars.63 The defendant in Jones 
could say that rolling back speedometers allowed them to recoup 
their cost of refurbishing cars and, relying on the assumption that the 
usage was widely known, resulted in no fraud because consumers 
were on notice. The tenant in Anewalt could argue that the usage 
would have been incorporated into the lease price, and therefore, it 
did not represent a windfall. These may or may not be good 
arguments, particularly the second one, but they are not impossible 
arguments, and the first may well be right. 
The problem with the presumption that widespread uses are 
reasonable is even more complicated than these examples suggest. As 
Professor Craswell argued, simple observation of behavior cannot 
establish a usage or custom that will help judges in deciding 
disputes.64 Prior behavior might have been different had the context 
in which it occurred been different. The observed pattern of decisions 
will be subject to interpretation: “any history of prior decisions will 
always underdetermine the possible patterns that might be ascribed to 
that history.”65  
For observed behavior to help a judge decide a case, the judge 
must first decide which aspects of the behavior are salient in the 
sense that they establish a practice relevant to the case at hand. For 
example, suppose, that all sales representatives in the software 
industry wear jeans and ripped T-shirts and that all license terms 
disclaim implied warranties. Assuming such disclaimers could 
otherwise stand as a course of dealing or usage of trade, do they 
apply if the sales representative wore a suit?66 Undoubtedly so. The 
point here is only that this conclusion rests on a substantive decision 
about what facts are relevant to the usage in question. Judges must 
make substantive decisions about how to classify the prior behavior 
in a way that produces a usage relevant to the decision they must 
make. Here, as elsewhere, Judge Cardozo’s caution is apt: “While 
 
 63. Even assuming the market was cartelized, one would favor steps that reduced the cost 
of production and increased total surplus. As Professor Schwartz argued, because the cartelists 
would maximize their profits, there is no reason to expect them to refuse to offer profitable 
warranties. See Schwartz, supra note 60.  
 64. Craswell, supra note 4, at 8.  
 65. Id.  
 66. Cf. id.  
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judges try to see cases clearly, they can never see them with any eyes 
but their own.”67  
One would expect parties who were always on one side of a class 
of transactions to favor usages of trade that favored that side. The 
same outcome would not be expected where firms did business both 
as promisor and promissee. Not knowing which side of a usage a firm 
would be on could act as a type of veil of ignorance behind which 
rational actors would produce usages that did not predictably favor 
one class of persons over another. As Morton Horwitz says of Lord 
Mansfield’s view of custom, it “depended for its practical 
implementation on a relatively small commercial community with 
fundamentally homogenous interests.”68 Horwitz gives marine 
insurance as a paradigm example, in significant part because in that 
field “eighteenth century English merchants served on different days 
as both insurer and insured, there was a common interest in settling 
legal rules and little resulting fear that the law would discriminate in 
favor of particular groups.”69  
Usages developed over numerous transactions by parties who 
participated both as promisor and promisee will tend to lower 
transaction costs to the greatest degree possible. That parties 
developing the usages participate on both sides of the transactions 
implies that suboptimal practices will not develop from efforts to 
skew returns to one side or another. This Article will call such usages 
reciprocal usages.  
We may at least speculate that reciprocal usages maximize 
welfare under the Pareto criterion because they are likely to lower 
transaction costs without systematically disadvantaging any party. In 
this regard, reciprocal usages are different from practices employed 
by parties who take only one side of a class of transactions. Practices 
employed by sellers in transactions with consumers are the obvious 
example. This Article will call these one-sided usages. They are the 
obvious targets of analysts concerned that firms will use form 
agreements to take advantage of consumers.  
There is nothing inherently wrong with one-sided usages. Judicial 
 
 67. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 13 (1921). 
 68. HORWITZ, supra note 40, at 190.  
 69. Id.  
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recognition of a one-sided usage may not disadvantage anyone. 
Sometimes, it is more important that a standard be set than that it be 
set a certain way.70 The numerous standards for commercial goods, 
from the width of threads on nuts and bolts to the size of spark plugs, 
to the TCP/IP protocol, to the dimensions of boards in a lumberyard, 
all attest to this fact.71 Many standards are set by organizations 
dedicated to the purpose, but they could be usages of trade as well.72 
In such cases, assuming there are adequately informed parties, a court 
might well consider it irrelevant that a vendor had set a standard and 
all purchasers conformed to it. A one-sided usage might allow 
vendors to take advantage of economies of scale, or to lower 
production costs in some other way.73 The result might be lower 
average prices and greater total surplus.74  
 
 70. Cf. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (“Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more 
important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.”). 
 71. E.g., Macauley, supra note 4, at 787.  
 72. Indeed, it may be that the most uncontroversial usages are ensconced in standards 
promulgated by organizations whose work suggests the increasing bureaucratization of private 
ordering as well as government. See David Charny, The New Formalism in Contract, 66 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 842, 846, 855-56 (1999). For examples of rent-seeking in standards-setting bodies, 
see David McGowan, The Problems With the Third Way; A Java Case Study, in REGULATING 
THE GLOBAL INFORMATION SOCIETY (Routledge 2000); Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, 
Could Java Change Everything? The Competitive Propriety of A Proprietary Standard, 43 
ANTITRUST BULL. 715 (1998). Perhaps the most obvious example of rent-seeking within a 
standards-setting organization is Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 
492 (1988). In that case, Indian Head sought permission from the National Fire Protection 
Association (NFPA) to market polyvinyl electrical conduit. This conduit required the NFPA to 
alter the National Electrical Code it had previously written, which allowed only steel conduit. 
Allied Tube, the nation’s largest maker of steel conduit, packed the NFPA meeting and voted 
down the proposal. Id. at 496-97; see also David McGowan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust 
Immunity: State Action and Federalism, Petitioning and the First Amendment, 17 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 293, 309-11 (1994) (discussing the Allied Tube case in detail).  
 73. There is some reason to believe, for example, that the cross-collateralization at issue in 
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) reflected the 
relatively high cost of selling to low income consumers and did not result in supracompetitive 
profits for retailers. See LON L. FULLER & MELVIN A. EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 66-
68 (6th ed. 1996). 
 74. For example, Lisa Bernstein suggests that broad disclaimers in shrink-wrap licenses 
may benefit producers by lowering litigation costs and that consumers benefit because 
reputational concerns may prompt vendors to grant licenses or fix defective code where the 
facts make such actions reasonable. Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law In A Merchant Court: 
Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1790-
91 (1996). 
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Recognizing one-sided usages might also cause courts to approve 
terms that systematically favor one side of a transaction. Lower 
production costs might not get passed along to consumers, for 
example, increasing profits for firms, and persons holding equity in 
them, instead. Even assuming this outcome, it does not follow that 
courts should refuse to recognize such a usage. Even if a one-sided 
usage benefitted only one side of a transaction, one could defend it 
under the Kaldor-Hicks criterion75 on the ground that it increased 
total surplus, probably by lowering production costs, by an amount 
greater than any losses to the other side.  
For present purposes, it is enough to note that the shift away from 
a practice of recognizing only reciprocal usages to a practice of 
recognizing one-sided usages is not inherently suspicious or 
objectionable. The shift may not be (probably is not) a Pareto-
superior move.76 Recognizing one-sided usages in addition to 
reciprocal usages may therefore imply a shift in the economic 
justification for recognizing usages of trade from Pareto to Kaldor-
Hicks optimality. That is not saying much, particularly if one believes 
the Pareto criterion is unrealistically strict.77 If there is a normative 
component to the recognition of usages of trade, and the normative 
component is welfarist in nature, one would hope that the shift in 
theories would be justified rather than implicit, and that some form of 
 
 75. For a discussion of Kaldor-Hicks criterion, see Ulen, supra note at 15. 
 76. Such a shift may have no effect, in which case the conclusion of Pareto optimality 
would not be undermined. It is more likely that such a shift will make participants on one side 
of transactions worse off relative to a world in which one-sided usages are not recognized. For a 
discussion of Pareto optimality, see KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL 
VALUES (2d ed. 1963). 
 77. E.g., Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 
YALE L. J. 1211, 1212 (1991).  
Transaction costs (including problems of rationality and knowledge), no less than 
existing technology, define what is currently achievable in any society—the Pareto 
frontier. It follows that any given society is always or will immediately arrive at a 
Pareto optimal point given transaction costs. Therefore no moves from the status quo 
are possible without either: (a) disadvantaging at least someone (hence making 
distributional considerations unavoidable); or (b) trying to shift the frontier outward 
(itself a chancy and costly process that usually entails distributional consequences). It 
also follows that the frequently made distinction between removing inefficiencies 
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reasoning resembling Kaldor-Hicks analysis would be discernible in 
cases in which usages were recognized and employed.  
Neither the U.C.C. nor UCITA goes very far in this regard. This 
Article returns to these points in Part III. First, however, it is useful to 
understand why we care about usage of trade in electronic commerce 
generally.  
II. JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO SHRINK-WRAP CASES 
Commercialization of the Internet, and the increase in products 
that are sold or licensed in digital form, makes contract rules for “e-
commerce” transactions increasingly important. UCITA tracks the 
U.C.C. by stating that a contract may be formed in any manner 
sufficient to show the agreement of the parties.78 This general 
principle allows for contracts to be formed through the exchange of 
terms and payment over time. This sequential or “layered” 
contracting model includes the notion of assent by use of a computer 
program or the failure to return the program after a certain time.79  
At present, UCITA’s position on sequential formation has 
substantial support in the case law. That was not always the case. In 
the early 1990s, courts in two significant cases refused to recognize 
the “reason to know” theory as a basis for inferring assent to post-
order or post-payment terms. From 1996 on, however, courts tended 
to accept this practice. In 2000, the Washington Supreme Court 
embraced this practice in an opinion that quoted the trial judge as 
saying that the case might have been decided differently in 1985, but, 
in 1997, shrink-wrap terms were binding on the parties and provided 
a defense against the plaintiff’s breach of warranty claims. 1990s 
shrink-wrap cases may therefore be viewed collectively as a case 
study in the recognition of a particular usage of trade—the provision 
of additional contract terms with software delivered after the initial 
communication between the parties.  
The first major case was Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse 
Technology.80 It is not actually a usage of trade case, but its facts and 
 
 78. UCITA § 202(a) (2000); U.C.C. § 204 (1998). 
 79. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.  
 80. 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991). 
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its course of dealing analysis are relevant here. Step-Saver was a 
value-added reseller that ordered software from The Software Link 
(TSL), which Step-Saver integrated into systems it sold to end users. 
The software malfunctioned and Step-Saver sued TSL for breach of 
warranty. TSL’s shrinkwraps disclaimed all warranties on its 
software, as well as liability for damages due to its software. The 
question was whether these disclaimers were part of the parties’ 
agreement. In an opinion by Judge Wisdom, the Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit held they were not.81  
The decision in Step-Saver rests mainly on the court’s analysis of 
when the parties’ formed their agreement. Step-Saver ordered 
software over the telephone from TSL.  
TSL would accept the order and promise, while on the 
telephone, to ship the goods promptly. After the telephone 
order, Step-Saver would send a purchase order, detailing the 
items to be purchased, their price, and shipping and payment 
terms. TSL would ship the order promptly, along with an 
invoice. The invoice would contain terms essentially identical 
with those on Step-Saver’s purchase order: price, quantity, and 
shipping and payment terms. No reference was made during 
the telephone calls or on either the purchase orders or the 
invoices with respect to a disclaimer of warranties.82  
Step-Saver argued that the parties formed their agreement during 
its telephone conversations with TSL. On this view, TSL’s 
shrinkwraps terms materially altered the terms of the telephone 
agreement and therefore, under U.C.C. section 2-207, were only a 
proposal for additional terms. Because Step-Saver did not expressly 
agree to this proposal, these additional terms did not limit its 
remedies.83 The court agreed, saying that “the box-top license should 
have been treated as a written confirmation containing additional 
terms” which, because they materially altered the original terms, “did 
not become a part of the parties’ agreement.”84  
 
 81. Id. at 108.  
 82. Id. at 96 
 83. Id. at 97. 
 84. Id. at 105-06. 
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To reach this conclusion, the court rejected TSL’s argument that 
the course of dealing between the parties established a basis for 
holding Step-Saver to the terms of the disclaimer. TSL pointed out 
that the parties engaged in a number of transactions85 and that it sent 
shrinkwrap licenses with each transaction. TSL argued that “even if 
the terms of the box-top license would not become part of the 
contract if the case involved only a single transaction, repeated 
expression of” the post-order terms “eventually incorporates them 
within a contract.”86  
The court rejected this argument for two reasons. The first of 
these was that  
the repeated exchange of forms by the parties only tells Step-
Saver that TSL desires certain terms. Given TSL’s failure to 
obtain Step-Saver’s express assent to those terms before it will 
ship the program, Step-Saver can reasonably believe that, 
while TSL desires to obtain certain terms, it has agreed to do 
business on other terms–those terms expressly agreed upon by 
the parties. Thus, even though Step-Saver would not be 
surprised to learn that TSL desires the terms of the box-top 
license, Step-Saver might well be surprised to learn that the 
terms of the box-top license have been incorporated into the 
parties’ agreement.87 
The court’s reference to TSL’s failure to obtain Step-Saver’s 
express assent can be read as limited to the facts of the case. TSL 
twice asked Step-Saver to “sign agreements that would put in formal 
terms the relationship” between the parties; “both proposed 
agreements contained warranty disclaimer and limitation of remedy 
terms similar to those” in the shrink-wraps. Both times Step-Saver 
refused to sign.88 The court’s language, however, does not have to be 
 
 85. Step-Saver installed 142 copies of the software, which it ordered in twenty-copy 
batches in seven separate orders. Id. at 95. 
 86. Id. at 103. The court was skeptical that TSL could establish a course of dealing as to 
terms the parties had not dealt with actively, saying that TSL sought to “extend the course of 
dealing analysis to this case where the only action has been the repeated sending of a particular 
form by TSL” and that “most courts have rejected such reasoning.” Id. at 103-04.  
 87. Id. at 104. 
 88. Id. at 102-03. 
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read that way. It could also imply that TSL had an obligation to 
obtain Step-Saver’s express agreement at some point and failed to 
satisfy that obligation.89  
This latter reading enjoys some support in the court’s second 
reason for rejecting TSL’s course of dealing argument, which is that  
the seller in these multiple transaction cases will typically have 
the opportunity to negotiate the precise terms of the parties’ 
agreement, as TSL sought to do in this case. The seller’s 
unwillingness or inability to obtain a negotiated agreement 
reflecting its terms strongly suggests that, while the seller 
would like the court to incorporate its terms if a dispute were 
to arise, those terms are not a part of the parties’ commercial 
bargain . . . . [W]e are not convinced that TSL’s unilateral act 
of repeatedly sending copies of the box-top license with its 
product can establish a course of dealing . . . that resulted in 
the adoption of the box-top license.90  
 This second argument seems broader than the first. It refers both 
to a seller’s inability to obtain express agreement and an 
unwillingness to seek it. The latter concept implies that the court 
believes sellers do have an obligation to obtain express consent if the 
seller wishes the terms to bind the buyer. This broader reading is 
borne out of the court’s relatively broad statement of its holding on 
this issue: “the repeated sending of a writing which contains certain 
standard terms, without any action with respect to those terms, cannot 
constitute a course of dealing which would incorporate a term of the 
writing otherwise excluded under § 2-207.”91 
Setting aside Step-Saver’s refusal to agree to documents including 
the shrinkwrap terms when actual bargaining occurred, the arguments 
 
 89. The court’s opinion does not say that Step-Saver refused to sign the proffered 
agreements because of the disclaimers and limitations. Maybe these terms were the sticking 
point, but the court does not describe these documents in detail. The court says only that the 
agreements included such terms and Step-Saver did not sign them. The court later discussed 
“more specific evidence as to the parties’ course of dealing or performance,” including Step-
Saver’s refusal to sign the agreements TSL offered. Id. at 104. That the court dealt with this fact 
separately as a piece of “specific” evidence also suggests that the statement in the text can be 
considered the court’s view of the law generally.  
 90. Id.  
 91. Id.  
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for enforcing the shrink-wrap terms on either a course of dealing or 
usage of trade analysis were very strong. Step-Saver was in the 
business of integrating software and hardware. It had started out as a 
value-added retailer for IBM in 1981 and then developed its multi-
user system, which included both off the shelf applications and some 
applications Step-Saver had written itself.92 Step-Saver’s business 
required it to be able to evaluate software and appreciate the 
probability and significance of defects. Step-Saver discussed the TSL 
software with TSL and tested the software itself.93 The opinion also 
includes a footnote tracing the use of the shrink-wrap method as a 
way for software vendors to avoid the first-sale doctrine. In that 
footnote, the court implicitly recognized that shrinkwrap agreements 
were at least commonly used by software producers.94  
Step-Saver’s expertise in software licensing and the common use 
of shrink-wraps in software transactions provided a basis for 
recognizing a usage of trade allowing delivery of additional terms 
with the software. Though the facts fit better with usage of trade 
doctrine, which was not at issue on the appeal, they were relevant to 
understanding the course of dealing argument as well. The Step-Saver 
court’s rejection of the course of dealing argument therefore appears 
to be at least partly normative. In particular, the court believed that a 
buyer in a multiple transaction case could reasonably believe that a 
seller’s shrink-wrap terms were not binding, even if the buyer knew 
the seller desired the terms, because the seller would have had a 
chance to seek express assent to the terms. On this view, the 
opportunity to obtain express agreement implied a duty to do so. The 
seller’s failure to discharge that duty justified the buyer disregarding 
the terms.  
This argument assumes that express assent is necessary for such 
terms to be binding. That assumption rejects the notion that a party 
can assent to terms by proceeding with a transaction in circumstances 
in which the party knows or should know that the other side expects 
shrinkwrap terms to apply. Why does the court take this position? 
 
 92. Id. at 94. One wonders what terms Step-Saver included with its own software, a point 
the court did not discuss. 
 93. Id.  
 94. Id. at 96 n.7. 
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The U.C.C. allows contracts to be formed in any manner sufficient to 
show the parties’ agreement, including through conduct.95 A course 
of dealing can be used to supplement an agreement as well as to 
interpret its terms.96 A course of dealing can be shown by evidence 
sufficient to establish a “sequence of previous conduct between the 
parties” that can fairly be regarded as “establishing a common basis 
of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other 
conduct.”97 Express assent is therefore not necessary; requiring it 
contradicts the notion that conduct can supplement an agreement as 
well as serve as a basis for interpretation. 
For these reasons, the court’s treatment of TSL’s course of dealing 
argument appears to rest on normative grounds. Rather than coming 
to grips with the rule that assent in the first instance might be 
established by conduct, the court seems to view express assent as a 
normative baseline requirement. Departures from that baseline seem 
suspect to the court, which could explain why it asserts that parties 
such as Step-Saver may reasonably rely on that baseline in 
interpreting the terms and behavior they see. If sellers have a duty to 
seek express assent, then perhaps this approach is acceptable. Such a 
duty, however, is at odds with the rule for establishing either a course 
of dealing or usage of trade.98 
The normative basis for the court’s approach is obscure. Perhaps 
the opinion reflects an aversion to form agreements generally. 
Perhaps the court believed that requiring negotiated assent lowers the 
risk of judicial error in ascertaining the terms of agreements. TSL’s 
terms were before the court, however, and the court’s rule would not 
avoid litigation over the content of the parties’ discussions when 
ordering software, so this reason is not very persuasive.  
 
 95. U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (1998). 
 96. U.C.C. § 1-205(3).  
 97. U.C.C. § 1-705(1). If TSL had raised a usage of trade argument, the same point would 
apply. The question would be why assent had to be express and could not be inferred from 
widespread and regular use of a method of dealing. The court did note that, on remand, a factual 
question remained as to whether “the custom in the trade is to exclude warranties and limit 
remedies in contracts between a software producer and its dealer.” 939 F.2d at 105 n.48. 
 98. If we are to use the ruling in the case at hand to draw inferences about the parties’ 
knowledge, it is at least equally plausible to say that a reasonable buyer would understand that 
such terms were binding, regardless of express agreement, if the shrink-wrap method satisfied 
the requirements of either course of dealing or usage of trade under the U.C.C.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol8/iss1/7
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Or perhaps the court worried that allowing fights over what the 
parties should have known would increase litigation costs while 
simultaneously reducing the reliability of decisions. Adding increased 
litigation costs to the equation, however, still does not suggest that 
the court’s assumption is efficient. Those costs would be incurred 
only in the relatively few cases that went to court. Why would it be 
more efficient to reduce those costs through a rule that raised 
transaction costs across the board? There may be answers to these 
questions, but the court did not supply them.99 
Two years after Step-Saver, TSL found itself a defendant in an 
action brought by Arizona Retail Systems (ARS).100 Like Step-Saver, 
ARS was a value-added retailer that ordered copies of TSL’s 
operating-system software, (PC-MOS), which ARS incorporated into 
multi-user systems it sold to its clients. ARS’s systems manager 
ordered a copy of PC-MOS, which he claimed was only to evaluate 
the software’s performance. The copy arrived with a shrink-wrap 
license agreement that, among other things, disclaimed warranties, 
limited remedies, prohibited assignment, and included an integration 
clause.101 
ARS’s agent “read the license agreement but thought it was 
unenforceable and incapable of overriding” specific representations 
 
 99. Another possibility is suggested by the mild note of sarcasm with which the court 
responded to Step-Saver’s argument that disclaiming warranties allowed software firms to 
manage their risks and, by implication, offer lower prices. The court seemed unimpressed, 
though it couched its rejection of the argument in traditional doctrinal terms rather than 
normative ones. 
TSL has raised a number of public policy arguments focusing on the effect on the 
software industry of an adverse holding concerning the enforceability of the box-top 
license. We are not persuaded that requiring software companies to stand behind 
representations concerning their products will inevitably destroy the software industry. 
We emphasize, however, that we are following the well-established distinction 
between conspicuous disclaimers made available before the contract is formed and 
disclaimers made available only after the contract is formed. When a disclaimer is not 
expressed until after the contract is formed, UCC §§ 2-207 governs the interpretation 
of the contract, and, between merchants, such disclaimers, to the extent they materially 
alter the parties’s agreement, are not incorporated into the parties’s agreement. 
939 F.2d at 104-05. Because the course of dealing argument was relevant to the parties’ 
knowledge at all times during the contracting process, the temporal distinction the court draws 
does not adequately respond to that argument. 
 100. Arizona Retail Sys., Inc. v. The Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759 (D. Az. 1993).  
 101. Id. at 761. 
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he said TSL employees had made.102 ARS purchased many copies of 
PC-MOS over the next year, using a procedure substantially 
equivalent to that employed in Step-Saver. ARS would place an order 
by telephone. The parties would discuss the specific software needed, 
the price, and the quantity. “[N]either party made any reference to the 
warranty disclaimers or liability limitations during either the calls or 
on the invoices. The license agreements, however, appeared on the 
face of the packaging of each set of software sent by TSL to ARS.”103 
As to the first transaction, the court found that ARS ordered an 
evaluation disk from TSL and that the evaluation disk came with a 
live copy of PC-MOS, which was enclosed in a shrink-wrap stating 
the license terms. The court concluded that TSL made an offer to sell 
PC-MOS by including the live copy with the evaluation disk, and that 
ARS accepted that offer by opening the shrink-wrap. The Court 
found that the initial transaction was different from the transaction in 
Step-Saver because the shrink-wrap terms were part of the initial 
offer.104 
The court treated later transactions differently, essentially 
following the approach in Step-Saver. Interestingly, the court did not 
discuss the course of dealing argument raised in Step-Saver, and TSL 
appears not to have raised the argument. This omission was curious 
because the facts of Arizona Retail Systems were much more 
favorable to the argument than were the facts in Step-Saver, where 
TSL tried and failed to obtain agreement to documents including its 
warranty terms, but continued dealing with Step-Saver anyway. By 
contrast, not only did ARS know of TSL’s terms in the first 
transaction, the court found the terms bound the parties as to that 
transaction. If the “reason to know” concept is sufficient to establish 
a contract that includes an agreement to post-order terms, it is hard to 
see why the concept did not compel a different result as to the later 
transactions in Arizona Retail Systems. 
Both Step-Saver and Arizona Retail Systems may be read as 
treating shrinkwrap terms as a suspicious deviation from the “usual” 
mode of contracting. Alternatively, the courts may be read as viewing 
 
 102. Id.  
 103. Id.  
 104. Id. at 763-64. 
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TSL’s forms as an example of the use of form agreements to impose 
onerous terms on buyers without the buyers’ actual assent. Neither 
court held that post-order shrink-wrap terms could not be part of a 
contract if the parties agreed to such a procedure up front. With the 
exception of the initial transaction in Arizona Retail Systems, 
however, the license terms failed as a defense in both cases. Neither 
court was willing to assume that the purchasers either knew or had 
reason to know that additional terms would follow the initial order, 
though the Step-Saver court was willing to assert that Step-Saver 
reasonably could have concluded that the terms were not binding. 
Both courts therefore refused to read an agreement to that effect into 
the parties’ initial exchange. In the case of Arizona Retail Systems, 
this reluctance was fairly strong, given the court’s finding on the 
initial agreement.  
ProCD v. Zeidenberg105 significantly changed the presumptive 
baseline for analyzing shrink-wrap terms. Zeidenberg bought 
ProCD’s SelectPhone database and software in a retail outlet. The 
code was packaged in a box indicating that there were additional 
contract terms inside.106 Zeidenberg made the database information 
available for free over the Internet. ProCD sued for breach of license 
terms. Zeidenberg defended on the ground that the terms were not 
binding. The court held that they were and ordered that judgment be 
entered in favor of ProCD. Three aspects of the decision are of 
particular interest: (1) its Coasean approach to a gap in property 
rights; (2) its analysis of price discrimination; and (3) its treatment of 
the baseline from which post-payment terms were to be evaluated.  
ProCD is first and foremost a case about a database presumed to 
 
 105. 86 F.3d 1447, 1451-53 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 106. Professor Macaulay warns us not to make too much of the label on the outside of the 
box:  
When we look at a ProCD box, Judge Easterbrook’s “offer” becomes pure fantasy. 
The notice is printed on the bottom flap of the box, flanked by a statement in large 
type that there are 250 million telephone numbers on 11 CD-Roms and the bar code 
for the scanner. The notice is printed in 6-point type in a space 2 3/4th inches by 1 
inch. The notice that there are terms and conditions inside the box begins in the third 
sentence in this paragraph. 
Maculey, supra note 4, at 779 n.25. 
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be ineligible for copyright protection.107 The database was costly to 
compile and maintain and the fairly obvious assumption driving the 
opinion is that a property right of some sort was needed to induce 
investment in a product that consumers evidently valued but to which 
the most nearly applicable property right did not extend. A clearly 
defined property right would induce investment by promising a return 
through exchange facilitated by the clarity of the right and legal rules 
lowering transaction costs.108 The court’s holding effectively allowed 
ProCD to create a property-like right which the Copyright Act did not 
provide. The reasoning was economic, and the choice to follow that 
reasoning to bridge a gap in property rights was at least partly 
normative. 
This point is related to the second point, about price 
discrimination. Judge Easterbrook argued that ProCD tried to charge 
different prices to commercial and non-commercial users and that it 
had to have an effective prohibition on redistribution to prevent 
arbitrage markets from popping up and undermining its plan.109 
Enforcement of the license terms provided that prohibition.  
Price discrimination is a tool by which producers can capture a 
greater proportion of available surplus than they can by charging a 
fixed price. In other words, it is a means for shifting consumer 
surplus to producer surplus. On the other hand, it also allows 
producers to charge a lower average price for their products, 
increasing the number of consumers who can afford to buy them. By 
casting the terms at a issue as necessary to facilitate marketing at a 
lower average price, Judge Easterbrook pointed to a plausible 
consumer benefit to the practice at issue even though price 
discrimination itself might shift surplus from consumers to producers.  
In a related point, Judge Easterbrook advised against any effort to 
use contract terms to police the division of surplus: “Competition 
among vendors, not judicial revision of a package’s contents, is how 
consumers are protected in a market economy . . . . [A]djusting terms 
 
 107. 86 F.3d at 1449 (citing Feist Pub’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 
(1991)). 
 108. E.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace Versus Property Law, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 
103 (1999); Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 207. 
 109. 86 F.3d at 1449-50. 
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in buyers’ favor might help Matthew Zeidenberg today . . . but would 
lead to a response that might make consumers as a whole worse 
off.”110 The Step-Saver court can plausibly be read as implicitly 
rejecting this type of argument,111 suggesting that the different 
normative perspective of the two courts influenced their view of 
course of dealing and usage of trade analysis. 
Couching enforcement of the shrink-wrap terms as at least 
plausibly a pro-consumer measure was an important step toward 
recognizing the shrink-wrap approach as a usage of trade. Judge 
Easterbrook’s argument took the classic law and economics form of 
demonstrating how a decision in favor of a particular member of a 
class might make the class as a whole worse off. This argument was a 
rhetorical and analytical strategy that drove Arthur Leff to distraction 
in 1974.112 By explaining how even a one-sided practice might 
benefit all concerned, Judge Easterbrook provided an actual reason 
behind the presumption that widespread use implies reasonability.  
Perhaps as importantly, ProCD plausibly described the use of 
shrink-wrap terms as an unexceptional example of a common method 
of contract formation rather than as the aberrant or malevolent 
practice the Step-Saver and Arizona Retail Systems courts seemed to 
perceive. Judge Easterbrook said that “[t]ransactions in which the 
exchange of money precede the communication of detailed terms are 
common,”113 citing insurance, airline tickets, concert tickets, and 
consumer electronics as examples. He added that the “pay now, read 
terms later” method of formation benefitted both consumers and 
producers, and that the terms were as much a part of the product as 
the code.114  
ProCD’s depiction of sequential formation as at least potentially 
benefitting consumers and as a normal and acceptable method of 
contracting strongly influenced subsequent courts. Judge 
Easterbrook’s average-price argument cast the shrink-wrap terms in a 
more favorable light. His analogies to contracting contexts that might 
 
 110. Id. at 1453.  
 111. See supra note 99. 
 112. See Arthur Alan Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 
60 VA. L. REV. 451 (1974).  
 113. 86 F.3d at 1451. 
 114. Id.  
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be more familiar to judges who did not buy much software went a 
long way toward normalizing the shrink-wrap method.  
Judge Easterbrook got the chance to reinforce these points in a 
more conventional context in Hill v. Gateway 2000,115 which 
extended the ProCD holding to cover cases where the licensee did 
not have a package warning that additional terms would follow after 
payment and delivery of a computer.116 Hill involved a mail-order 
purchase of retail hardware and software by an end user. The 
purchase was arranged over the telephone. The plaintiffs specified the 
desired product and provided the defendant with a credit card 
number. The defendant agreed to ship a computer loaded with 
software.  
Painting a plausible picture of an uninterested consumer forced to 
listen to rote recitation of contract terms over the telephone, Judge 
Easterbrook again argued that “Customers as a group are better off 
when vendors skip costly and ineffectual steps such as telephonic 
recitation, and use instead a simple approve or return device.”117 This 
argument is true, but it does not explain why Gateway could not have 
 
 115. 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997), cert denied, 522 U.S. 808 (1997). 
 116. Id. Though in Hill Judge Easterbrook said that ProCD had already decided the matter, 
ProCD refers to terms on the outside of the software package giving notice that further terms 
would be found inside. 86 F.3d at 1451. Thus, the statement in that case that “notice on the 
outside, terms on the inside, and a right to return the software for a refund if the terms are 
unacceptable . . . may be a means of doing business valuable to buyers and sellers alike.” Id.  
 117. 105 F.3d at 1149. Judge Easterbrook summarized: 
A customer picks up the phone, orders a computer, and gives a credit card number. 
Presently a box arrives, containing the computer and a list of terms, said to govern 
unless the customer returns the computer within 30 days. Are these terms effective as 
the parties’ contract, or is the contract term-free because the order-taker did not read 
any terms over the phone and elicit the customer’s assent? 
Id. at 1148. He concluded that: 
Practical considerations support allowing vendors to enclose the full legal terms with 
their products. Cashiers cannot be expected to read legal documents to customers 
before ringing up sales. If the staff at the other end of the phone for direct sales 
operations such as Gateway’s had to read the four page statement of terms before 
taking the buyer’s credit card number, the droning voice would anesthetize rather than 
enlighten many potential buyers. Others would hang up in a rage over the waste of 
their time. And oral recitation would not avoid customers’ assertions (whether true or 
feigned) that the clerk did not read term X to them, or that they did not remember or 
understand it. Writing provides benefits for both sides of commercial transactions.  
Id. at 1149. 
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mentioned to customers before charging their credit cards that 
Gateway was willing to deal only on additional terms that would be 
shipped with the computer. 
At oral argument, the plaintiffs claimed that the lack of any notice 
that additional terms would follow the telephone order distinguished 
Hill from ProCD. Judge Easterbrook disposed of the point quickly, 
concluding that the plaintiffs did have such notice. He wrote that “the 
Hills knew before they ordered the computer that the carton would 
include some important terms, and they did not seek to discover these 
in advance.”118 He based this statement on the ground that 
“Gateway’s ads state that their products come with limited warranties 
and lifetime support.”119 Because the advertisements did not specify 
the content of these terms, Judge Easterbrook said, they amounted to 
sufficient notice that additional terms would accompany the product’s 
delivery.120 
Judge Easterbrook probably would have found that a contract had 
been formed even without the snippet of language on Gateway’s 
advertisements. Most likely, having normalized the use of shrink-
wraps in ProCD, Judge Easterbrook thought the shrink-wrap method 
was so well-established that the Hills either knew or had reason to 
know that additional terms would be coming. As he put it, “payment 
preceding the revelation of full terms is common for air 
transportation, insurance, and many other endeavors.”121  
The approach in Hill contradicted the Step-Saver court’s treatment 
of course of dealing. Rather than a presumption that assent must be 
express, it comes close to a presumption that the parties either know 
or reasonably should know that the transaction involves post-order 
and post-payment terms. Why? Because that is how things are done 
in this type of business. Says who? In this case, Judge Easterbrook; in 
Step-Saver, Judge Wisdom.  
Both Hill and Step-Saver work from implicit assumptions about 
the information contracting parties should be presumed to have. The 
difference in outcomes is, in significant part, a function of the 
 
 118. Id. at 1150. 
 119. Id.  
 120. Id.  
 121. Id. at 1149. 
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different presumptions the two courts applied. Ironically enough, it is 
at least possible that the judges in both cases were right. Perhaps use 
of the shrink-wrap method became more common between 1991 and 
1996. Or perhaps most software vendors used shrink-wraps in both 
1991 and 1996, but the extent of the software market had grown, 
making judges more familiar with the practice. Or perhaps Judge 
Easterbrook was better able or more willing to classify shrink-wraps 
as an instance of a familiar type of transaction, while Judge Wisdom 
viewed software licensing as unknown territory.  
Or perhaps Judge Wisdom simply could not get past the fact that 
the parties had bargained over an agreement including the shrink-
wrap terms but had not signed it. The court stated its reasons in 
broader terms, but there is always a chance that the failure to sign a 
bargained agreement colored the court’s view of the case as a whole. 
Judicial presumptions about the fairness and usefulness of form 
agreements may have played a role too. Judge Wisdom was less 
receptive to the economic justifications for shrinkwraps than was 
Judge Easerbrook, though the database aspect of ProCD may account 
for at least some of this difference. To the degree any but the first of 
these conjectures is even partly true, we have a credible example of 
the role judges themselves play as a variable in recognizing usages of 
trade.  
ProCD and Hill proved to be appealing precedents. Judges in 
three other Gateway cases quickly adopted their formation 
analysis,122 and another court embraced the notion that the shrink-
wrap method benefitted consumers.123 The court in Brower v. 
Gateway 2000, which refused to enforce the choice of an arbitrator 
selected in Gateway’s form terms, though it enforced the requirement 
of arbitration, was persuaded that “transactions involving ‘cash now’, 
terms later’ have become commonplace enabling the consumer to 
make purchases of sophisticated merchandise such as computers over 
 
 122. Westendorf v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.2d (CBC) 1110 (Del. Ch. 
2000); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 571-72 (1998); Levy v. Gateway 
2000, Inc., 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.2d (CBC) 1060 (N.Y. 1997).  
 123. Rinaldi v. Iomega Corp., 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.2d (CBC) 1143 (Del. Super. Ct. 1999) 
(“The commercial practicalities of modern retail purchasing make it eminently reasonable for a 
seller of a product such as a Zip drive to place a disclaimer of the implied warranty of 
merchantability within the plastic packaging.”).  
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the phone or by mail–and even by computer.”124 Even the district 
court in Klocek v. Gateway, Inc.,125 which criticized and refused to 
follow both ProCD and Hill, apparently would have recognized the 
shrink-wrap terms at issue as part of the parties’ agreement if 
Gateway had mentioned at the time of order that it would deal only 
subject to additional terms that would be provided with the 
product.126 
Which brings us full circle, to M.A. Mortenson Company, Inc. v. 
Timberline Software Corporation.127 Mortenson was a large 
construction contractor. It used Timberline’s Bid Analysis software, 
which was “designed for use by general contractors preparing 
construction bids.”128 Bid Analysis “analyzes project requirements as 
well as bid information from subcontractors and finds the lowest cost 
combination of subcontractors to carry out the work.”129 Mortenson 
was using a version of Bid Analysis called Medallion. When 
Mortenson upgraded its hardware, however, it learned that Medallion 
was not compatible with its new operating system. A local dealer for 
Timberline advised Mortenson that a new version of Bid Analysis, 
ironically named “Precision,” would work with Mortenson’s new 
system. 
On the advice of the dealer, Mortenson ordered eight copies of 
Precision Bid Analysis software, for use in its home and regional 
offices.130 After Timberline’s dealer named a price, Mortenson issued 
a purchase order for the software. The purchase order did not include 
an integration clause.131 The software arrived in boxes filled with 
disks in pouches and some manuals. Timberline’s license terms were 
printed on the outside of the disk pouches and on the inside cover of 
the manuals. A reference to the license terms also appeared on the 
 
 124. 676 N.Y.S.2d at 572.  
 125. 104 F. Supp.2d 1332 (D. Kan. 2000).  
 126. Id. at 1341 n.14. Klocek cited M.A. Mortenson Co., Inc. v. Timberline Software Corp., 
998 P.2d 305 (Wash. 2000), and mentioned the Washington Supreme Court’s course of dealing 
analysis, which apparently would not have applied to Klocek, but did not discuss Mortenson’s 
usage of trade analysis, which presumably would have applied to Klocek.  
 127. 998 P.2d 305 (Wash. 2000). 
 128. Id. at 307 n.1. 
 129. Id.  
 130. Id. Mortenson later ordered a ninth copy. Id. at n.2.  
 131. Id. at 308.  
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first screen each time the software was booted up. The software was 
also accompanied by copy protection hardware, which had to be 
attached to Mortenson’s hardware in order to run the Precision Bid 
Analysis program. There was one device for each copy of the 
program and each device carried its own license.132  
The Precision software had a bug. On the day Mortenson 
calculated a final bid for a large project, the bug caused the software 
to crash, displaying the intriguing message “Abort: Cannot find 
alternate.” This series of events happened nineteen times.133 
Undaunted, Mortenson’s employees pressed on, finally getting the 
software to generate a bid, which Mortenson submitted. The bid was 
approximately $1.95 million too low.  
Mortenson sued Timberline for breach of warranty. Timberline 
countered that its license terms limited the remedies for which it 
could be held liable to the amount of the license fee. The trial court 
granted summary judgment in Timberline’s favor, holding that the 
license terms were effective to bar the recovery Mortenson sought. In 
granting the motion, the trial judge said that “if this case had arisen in 
1985 rather than 1997, I might have a different ruling,” but that, on 
the facts before the court, the license terms controlled.134  
One wonders what, exactly, such a statement might mean. What 
had changed, and why did it matter? A plausible conjecture is that the 
trial judge’s comment reflected the court’s view that the sequential 
formation method Timberline employed was increasingly common, 
or at least increasingly familiar to judges, and therefore should be 
respected.  
The Washington Supreme Court also seemed persuaded by the 
notion that times had changed, and it gave some reasons for this 
view. Most pertinently, the Supreme Court said that “Mortenson and 
Timberline had a course of dealing; Mortenson had purchased 
licensed software from Timberline for years prior to its upgrade to 
Precision Bid Analysis.”135 The course of dealing was relevant 
 
 132. Id. The parties disputed the manner in which the software was actually installed, but 
that dispute is not relevant here.  
 133. Id. at 309.  
 134. Id. at 310.  
 135. Id. at 314. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol8/iss1/7










2002]  Recognizing Usages of Trade 203 
 
 
because “[a]ll Timberline software, including the prior version of Bid 
Analysis used by Mortenson since at least 1990, is distributed under 
license.”136 The court concluded that the post-order terms were 
therefore part of the parties’ agreement and provided a defense 
against Mortenson’s warranty claim.  
The Mortenson court thus reversed the inference the Step-Saver 
court had drawn about the course of dealing between the parties. As 
we have seen, Step-Saver acknowledged that the purchaser in that 
case might well have expected that post-order terms would come with 
its software, but it did not view that fact as particularly significant. 
The court there said that the purchaser reasonably could have thought 
the post-order terms were a request for additional terms and were not 
binding. Mortenson looked at similar facts and concluded that 
because the purchaser expected additional terms to come with the 
software, the additional terms were part of the parties’ agreement.  
Presumably, the Mortenson court either did not care whether the 
purchaser thought the additional terms were binding or thought it 
would be unreasonable for the purchaser to question the validity of 
the terms. The court did not explain why the expectation that post-
order terms would be delivered justified the further conclusion that 
the parties agreed that such terms would be binding.  
Roughly the same can be said of the court’s usage of trade 
analysis. The court referred to “extensive testimony and exhibits 
before the trial court” which established “an unquestioned use of such 
license agreements throughout the software industry.”137 Mortenson 
failed to dispute this evidence, questioning only its relevance. The 
usage of trade analysis was, therefore, an alternative basis on which 
the trial court’s summary judgment ruling could be affirmed.  
The court’s use of the word “unquestioned” is interesting. The 
court did not describe in any detail the evidence submitted on 
summary judgment, so it is not entirely clear: (i) whether the 
adjective refers only to Mortenson’s failure to contest the evidence; 
(ii) whether it implies that the evidence submitted claimed that there 
was no dispute that vendors such as Timberline always used post-
order terms; or (iii) whether the evidence submitted claimed that both 
 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id.  
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vendors and purchasers endorsed the use of such terms. The third 
possibility is unlikely. If nothing else, Mortenson disputed the 
validity of the procedure in the case before the court, as did the 
purchasers in the other cases examined.  
If we assume that the second meaning is the one the court had in 
mind, one faces the result contemplated by the U.C.C. and UCITA: 
The purchaser is bound because most if not all vendors employ the 
practice, regardless whether the purchaser believes the practice 
creates binding terms in addition to those stated at the time of the 
initial order.  
Much more can be said about Mortenson, but by now the 
normative aspect of judicial recognition of usages of trade should be 
clear. To say that a purchaser has reason to know that additional 
terms will follow an initial order is not necessarily to say that the 
purchaser will or should expect such terms to be binding. The 
disparity between the approach employed in Step-Saver and in both 
Hill and Mortenson shows that much. To hold that the terms are 
binding requires some reason for preferring the vendor’s expectation 
to that of the purchaser.  
Uniformity of practice might be one such reason, as the 
presumption of reasonability stated in the comments to U.C.C. 
section 1-205 make clear. But suppose, as Mark Lemley has 
suggested, that the beliefs of purchasers are as uniform as the beliefs 
of vendors, and that purchasers believe post-order terms are 
unenforceable unless the purchaser expressly agrees to them.138 In 
that case, we would have evidence of two mutually exclusive usages, 
both presumed to be reasonable, and these usages would cancel each 
other out. At that point, usages of trade could not be used, as UCITA 
contemplates, to make the terms binding. Although purchasers would 
have reason to know that vendors considered post-order terms 
binding, vendors would have reason to know that the purchaser 
rejected this position.  
One could try to avoid this dilemma by positing that purchaser 
beliefs are not uniform on this point. Perhaps not, but neither Hill nor 
Mortenson rests on that ground, and it is not clear how such a claim 
 
 138. E.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Law and Economics of Internet Norms, 73 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 1257, 1274 (1998). 
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could be verified or disproved with any confidence. Purchasers in 
litigation uniformly contest post-order terms, but that sort of 
hindsight evidence is not worth much. It is easier for vendors to make 
broad statements about what other vendors do, as seems to have been 
the case in Mortenson, but the relative ease with which flat 
statements about practices can be made seems a particularly hollow 
basis for recognizing a usage of trade.  
Judge Easterbrook’s average-price argument provides one 
possible answer. If enforcement of post-order terms lowers the 
average price of software, then a simple rational actor assumption 
implies that most purchasers would agree ex ante that the terms were 
enforceable. This rule might also be true if the terms lowered only the 
average cost of production. The after-the-fact protestations of actual 
litigants could be dismissed as sour grapes, and the usage recognized 
on hypothetical bargain grounds, which is really just a way of 
describing the implication of the rational actor assumption.139 
The opinion of the Washington Court of Appeals in Mortenson 
employed just this analysis when it concluded that Timberline’s 
limitation on remedies was conscionable. On the question of 
procedural unconscionability, the court considered the evidence of 
widespread usage to be evidence of conscionability, noting that “such 
limitations provisions are widely used in the computer software 
industry.”140 The court of appeals followed this approach on the 
substantive branch of analysis as well, saying that terms limiting 
liability for consequential damages 
are standard in the software industry and do not shock the 
conscience. Indeed, they are useful in making software 
affordable. If software developers were prohibited from 
limiting consequential damages, the significant costs to the 
industry would be passed on to the consumer. We conclude 
 
 139. See JULES COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 169 (1992) (“[T]here appears to be nothing 
expressed by the concept of hypothetical consent that is not already captured in the idea of 
rational self interest.”). 
 140. M.A. Mortenson Co., Inc. v. Timberline Software Corp., 970 P.2d 803, 812 (Wash. 
App. 1999). 
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that the limitations of remedies provision is not substantively 
unconscionable.141  
The Washington Supreme Court’s opinion was consistent with 
this approach. The court reasoned that “the same uncontradicted 
evidence of trade usage and course of dealing in our analysis of 
contract formation supports the conclusion that the clause is 
procedurally conscionable.”142 The Court blended consideration of 
both standard practice and the economics of the transaction. On 
substantive unconscionability the court said that, “[i]n a purely 
commercial transaction, especially involving an innovative product 
such as software, the fact an unfortunate result occurs after the 
contracting process does not render an otherwise standard limitation 
of remedies clause substantively unconscionable.”143 
There is nothing inherently wrong with these sorts of arguments. 
No doubt they are right much, and perhaps, most of the time. In 
analyzing such arguments, however, we have to remember two 
things. First, if one accepts such arguments as a basis for recognizing 
usages of trade, one must also accept that recognition of usages is to 
some degree normative rather than purely descriptive. For the court 
of appeals in Mortenson and, to a less explicit degree, for the 
Washington Supreme Court, recognition of the usage rested to some 
degree on the benefits the usage provides, on average, to the class of 
persons against whom the usage is asserted.  
Second, average cost or average price arguments are blunt 
instruments. They may justify recognition of usages of trade in many 
cases, but only as part of a broader analysis. If the usage is a penalty 
clause for breach, for example, one would have to consider the 
average cost argument in light of arguments in favor of efficient 
breach. If the usage is the forfeiture of the first-born child, then one 
would have to balance average cost arguments against whatever 
moral considerations one deemed relevant. Average price or cost 
arguments are useful, and they are important, but they must be 
considered in context.  
 
 141. Id. at 812. 
 142. 998 P.2d 315-16 n.12 (Wash. 2000).  
 143. Id. at 315.  
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The case for recognizing either a course of dealing or usage of 
trade justifying post-order shrink-wrap terms was much stronger in 
Step-Saver than in Mortenson. The buyer in Step-Saver was 
experienced in writing and integrating software and engaged in 
several software transactions with its vendor. The buyer in Mortenson 
was a construction firm that, insofar as the opinion discloses, had no 
software expertise. (Indeed, the construction firm may well have 
thought the relevant usages were those applying to purchases by a 
general contractor of inputs for a construction project.) The buyer in 
Mortenson relied on a sales agent for the vendor to diagnose why its 
old software would not work with its new hardware and to 
recommend an appropriate upgrade. This action was precisely the 
type of thing that Step-Saver could have done for itself. Mortenson 
previously licensed at least one generation of software from the 
vendor, but the record disclosed no more than the prior purchase of a 
single version.144  
Nevertheless, the course of dealing argument was rejected in Step-
Saver and accepted in Mortenson. (And the reasoning of Step-Saver 
cut against the usage of trade analysis in Mortenson.) Many variables 
are relevant to explaining this result. But one can at least conjecture 
that courts became more willing to recognize the post-order 
shrinkwrap method as judges became more familiar with it, whether 
through cases or personal experience, and as they came to accept the 
practice as creating surplus-enhancing efficiencies rather than 
viewing it as a means of taking unfair advantage of consumers.  
Though not formally relevant under the U.C.C. or UCITA, a 
judge’s information about a practice will influence the judge’s 
decision whether to recognize a usage or allow evidence of a claimed 
usage to go to a jury. If this statement is accepted as true, the question 
becomes what to do with the role of the judge in recognizing usages.  
Unexplained, ad-hoc recognition of trade usages reduces the value 
of the concept by making it difficult for parties to determine what 
 
 144. Because Mortenson had several offices, its license of Medallion Bid Analysis may 
have included multiple copies of the program, but for present purposes it is best to characterize 
the Medallion transaction as a single transaction involving licenses for multiple locations.  
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practices will be recognized as a usage, which in turn reduces the 
certainty of contracting.145 Recognizing that a judge’s own 
information and opinions affect the usages of trade a judge is willing 
to recognize is important because it helps scholars and practitioners 
think clearly about a portion of the analysis that neither the U.C.C. 
nor UCITA recognizes. If it is inevitable that a judge’s view of 
usages of trade will be influenced by his or her own beliefs, then 
providing analytical tools that allow those beliefs to be brought out 
and tested in a rigorous way will make the process more accessible to 
the parties. Hopefully, it will also lead to better decisions—ones that 
explain the basis for recognizing a usage of trade in a way that 
lawyers and clients can understand and take into account in future 
behavior.  
Having explored the shifting assumptions in shrink-wrap cases 
throughout the 1990s, it is best to explore this point through a 
concrete example that might be relevant in the future. Section 401(a) 
of UCITA states that a “licensor of information that is a merchant 
regularly dealing in information of the kind warrants that the 
information will be delivered free of the rightful claim of any third 
person by way of infringement or misappropriation.”146 In substance, 
this warranty assures the licensee that the licensee can use the 
software without breaking the law. Infringement requires no proof of 
intent, so a licensee making RAM copies with an infringing product 
is an infringer. The default warranty gives the licensee a cause of 
action for indemnity in the event the licensee is enjoined from using 
the software or otherwise suffers damages.147  
Section 401(d) of UCITA allows vendors to disclaim the warranty 
of noninfringement. Essentially, it allows vendors to refuse to 
provide licensees any assurance that the licensee may legally use the 
software in its intended manner without violating the intellectual 
property rights of a third party. At first, this provision seems 
unexceptional. Warranties are often implied and often disclaimed. 
 
 145. See Warren, supra note 38, at 581-82. 
 146. UCITA § 401(a) (2001). 
 147. See, e.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computing, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993). 
The 1998 Amendments to 17 U.S.C. § 117 probably do not affect this conclusion. For 
background on that amendment, see, e.g., MARK A. LEMLEY ET AL., SOFTWARE AND INTERNET 
LAW 201-04 (2000). 
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The U.C.C. allows this procedure, so why not UCITA, and why not 
the warranty of non-infringement? The usual arguments about 
warranties also apply: Contract terms are as much a part of the 
product as the code; to compel a vendor to provide a warranty is to 
dictate the terms of the agreement and the nature of the product on 
offer. One could argue that legislatures and judges are not competent 
to do these things, and therefore one should not protest if a vendor 
wishes to disclaim a warranty. 
These are strong arguments; in many cases they are compelling. In 
this context, however, they may carry less than their usual weight. 
The intrusion into product design that these arguments protest is a 
fundamental feature of intellectual property rights. No vendor may 
use infringing code in its own product, and is subject to injunctive 
relief and damages if it does. A vendor who knowingly incorporates 
infringing code into a product is liable for the infringement of its 
customers, if only as a contributory infringer. Vendors already face 
enough liability risk to give them an economic incentive to police 
their product to keep out infringing code. The cost of determining 
whether a product infringes, and the expected cost of infringement 
suits, are already imposed on vendors by the relevant intellectual 
property statutes. No warranty disclaimer will change that fact.  
The marginal cost of indemnity claims by licensees who might 
suffer harm if they were enjoined from using a vendor’s software 
remains. If an injunction shut down a licensee’s business, for 
example, the licensee might sue the vendor for lost profits. If for no 
other reason, infringement plaintiffs might sue licensees to put 
pressure on a vendor to settle a claim. It is not clear how much the 
risk of indemnity actions would add to the expected cost of 
infringement claims. If the risk of such actions was too remote, or too 
hard to calculate, then the additional amount might be very small, 
which would imply that average cost or average price arguments 
could do little to justify such disclaimers. If the additional expected 
cost was significant, however, such arguments might carry a lot of 
weight. 
Even then, however, it would not necessarily follow that such 
disclaimers could be justified. The prohibition on infringement 
implies that, as a matter of intellectual property policy, it is desirable 
for vendors to determine whether their products include infringing 
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code. If nothing else, the vendor could seek a license for such code, 
the type of bargaining that drives the reward system the rights 
embody. Vendors are certainly in a better position to investigate 
whether their code infringes than are purchasers. Vendors have both 
the source code and the ability to trace its authorship. Purchasers 
often receive only binary code that vendors claim is a trade secret. 
Vendors are therefore better able to assess the probability that an 
infringement claim might be brought or be successful; they are the 
low-cost investigators of infringement.  
Users are better able to estimate the costs of an injunction, 
however. They would normally be able to insure against such losses 
more efficiently than vendors. Without information about the content 
of the code, however, they are in a poor position to estimate the 
probability of liability. Perhaps the vendor’s reputation could be used 
as a proxy for that probability, but the disclaimer lessens the 
reliability of such inferences somewhat.  
It is therefore hard to use the least-cost insurer concept to decide 
whether to enforce the disclaimer. Insurance requires an estimation of 
the probability and magnitude of loss, and the best and cheapest 
knowledge of these two variables lies on different sides of such 
software transactions. One cannot say as a purely logical matter that 
either vendors or users are the least-cost insurers of infringement. 
Section 401(d) of UCITA allows the warranty of non-
infringement to be disclaimed in two ways. The first is with specific 
language stating that “the licensor does not warrant that competing 
claims do not exist or that the licensor purports to grant only the 
rights it may have.”148 The second way is through evidence of 
“circumstances that give the licensee reason to know” that the 
licensor disclaims the warranty.149  
As we have seen, section 114(f) of UCITA provides that “reason 
to know” includes usages of trade, which section 102(66) defines to 
 
 148. UCITA § 401(d). In December 2000, a UCITA Standby committee proposed an 
amendment to section 401(d) specifying sample language for disclaiming hold-harmless 
obligations. This amendment in part repeated the “reason to know” language discussed in the 
text. See Report of UCITA Standby Committee, Dec. 17, 2001, at http://www.nccusl.org/ 
nccusl/UCITA-2001-comm-fin.htm (visited Mar. 1, 2002). As of this writing, no action had 
been taken on this proposed amendment. 
 149. Id. 
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include widely used practices. The upshot is that (i) software vendors 
can disclaim a warranty that users will not violate the law by using 
the software in the manner for which it is intended; (ii) if they do so 
individually, they must expressly disclaim the warranty; and (iii) if 
they do so collectively and consistently, the express disclaimer is not 
necessary.  
In reality, of course, it probably would be a rare case in which a 
usage sufficient to work as a silent disclaimer under section 401(d) 
was proved without being established in the first instance by uniform 
use of the type of express disclaimers authorized by section 401(d). 
Once a usage was established, however, it is not clear that section 
401(d) would require that the disclaimers be continued, just as in Hill 
and Mortenson there was no requirement that software vendors 
mention at the time of the initial order that they would be sending 
additional terms to the customer. The cost of continuing express 
disclaimers would be trivial, and there would be evidentiary value to 
using them, so the silent disclaimer notion is probably nothing more 
than an academic hypothetical. It does, however, serve to focus our 
attention on the decisions a court would have to make in confronting 
such a usage.  
The point of all of this is not that UCITA is wrong to allow a 
warranty of non-infringement to be disclaimed, either explicitly or by 
usage of trade. It is not obvious that such disclaimers should or 
should not be allowed. The analysis above hopefully demonstrates 
that this argument presents a close and complex question. To the 
extent usages of trade may be relevant to disclaimers, a judge 
considering whether to recognize a usage should work through such 
an analysis in very explicit terms with the full participation of the 
parties. The Kaldor-Hicks criterion provides a framework for 
evaluating the welfare effects of disclaimers. It should help make the 
court’s consideration of the costs and benefits of the proffered usage 
more rigorous and more easily replicated by lawyers who sell advice 
to clients.  
Some courts explicitly consider the risk or loss-bearing effects of 
practices in deciding whether to recognize them.150 One can at least 
 
 150. See Craswell, supra note 4, at 43-45. Professor Craswell cites Charter Title Corp. v. 
Crown Mortgage Corp., 836 P.2d 846, 850 (Wash. 1992), as one example. The court there 
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conjecture that courts take such considerations into account when 
deciding whether to recognize usages. The consideration may or may 
not be purely economic, as the differences in Step-Saver and ProCD 
suggest, but it is simply not realistic to expect a court to ignore the 
economic or policy implications of a practice when deciding whether 
to recognize it as a usage of trade. 
It is better to articulate such concerns explicitly and apply them to 
the facts of concrete cases than to let them operate silently. Neither 
the U.C.C. nor UCITA requires such articulation, which discourages 
the kind of reasoned elaboration that might assist lawyers and clients 
in determining when usages will be recognized. Although requiring 
litigants to explain why the usages they advance make sense in the 
context of a transaction might seem to risk activist judges re-writing 
contracts about which they know nothing, this criticism seems off the 
mark. If one accepts that there is inevitably a normative component to 
recognizing usages of trade, then the question is not whether 
 
refused to recognize as a course of dealing a bank’s practice of providing endorsements to 
checks that lacked them, stating that: 
“There are also sound policy reasons for not judicially imposing such a duty upon 
depository banks. It is a well known principle of tort law that the risk of loss should be 
borne by the one who can most economically avoid the loss.” Id. at 850 (citing United 
States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947)); see GUIDO 
CALEBRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970); 
Richard Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972). As Oliver 
Wendell Holmes wrote almost one hundred years ago: “[T]he safest way to secure care 
is to throw the risk upon the person who decides what precautions should be taken.” 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, 117 (1923). In this case, Charter was 
clearly in the best position to take the precautions necessary to prevent the loss. All it 
had to do was to look twice for proper endorsements before depositing its checks, 
hardly a burdensome task. On the other hand, imposing a duty on depository banks to 
find all missing endorsements would be extremely costly for the banks and would 
ultimately diminish the efficiency of the check collecting system as a whole. 
See also W. Indus., Inc. v. Newcor Canada, Ltd., 739 F.2d 1198, 1204 (7th Cir. 1984): 
That contractual liability for such damages (in the absence of special notice) is of 
relatively recent vintage, that many breaches of contract are (as here) involuntary, that 
only the sky would be the limit to the amount of consequential damages that 
manufacturers of machinery indispensable to their customers’ businesses might run up, 
that those customers not only have a better idea of what the potential injury to them 
might be but also might be able to avert it more easily than their supplier—all these 
things make it not at all incredible that a custom might have evolved in this industry 
against a buyer’s getting consequential damages in the event of a breach. 
Id. 
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normative concerns will affect the decision but whether the process 
will be litigated openly.  
CONCLUSION 
Both UCITA and the U.C.C. say they are concerned with taking 
into account the reality of commercial practice. But the statutes deal 
with judges as well as commerce, and it would seem equally 
desirable for the statutes to take into account the reality of judicial 
practice as well. In order to make the normative component of usage 
of trade analysis as explicit and rigorous as possible, courts should 
explicitly require a plausible Kaldor-Hicks justification for the usage 
at issue. Where contracting takes place against the prominent 
background of intellectual property rights and limitations, as is likely 
to be the case with many if not most e-commerce transactions, these 
policies are likely to be of great importance. Explicit consideration of 
the welfare implications of usages will allow parties to litigate them 
openly and give lawyers a more complete basis on which to advise 
clients.  
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